A Friendly Response to James White on Divine Simplicity
James White agreeing with William Lane Craig on anything is almost as shocking and confusing as the “Martha” scene in Batman v. Superman. Or, depending on what you think of both men, it may be more like the reunion of Mermaid Man and Barnacle Boy.
But regardless of their previous disagreements and our opinions of them, they have joined forces to critique divine simplicity in the Reformed Scholastic tradition. While the two doctors have multiple objections to simplicity, I want to focus on just one common objection: divine simplicity removes all distinction between God’s attributes.
Dr. White believes that simplicity described in Classical Theism makes God’s attributes all mean the same thing.[1] He says,
“As Aquinas evidently takes this…you cannot discuss the attributes of God in a way that would make them different to one another because that then implies parts which denies the simplicity of God. So, God’s omniscience is His omnipresence and His imminence…and basically Craig was saying, ‘That doesn’t make any sense.’ And I was sitting there going, ‘Yeah. He’s right. It doesn’t make any sense.’ And yet that’s the Classical Theism stuff that’s being presented now.”[2]
But does anyone actually teach that God’s attributes are all identical? Or, to use White’s examples, does anyone actually teach that God’s omniscience is His omnipotence?
They certainly do…in a way.
An Understandable Misunderstanding
It is not difficult to find theologians affirming exactly what White says.
James Dolezal, in his watershed book on Classical Theism, says, “It further follows from God’s non-compositeness that in Him all His attributes are really identical with each other.”[3]
John Owen seems to say the same thing: “The attributes of God, which alone seem to be distinct in the essence of God, are all of them essentially the same with one another, and every one the same with the essence of God.”[4]
Francis Turretin says, “The attributes of God cannot really differ from his essence or from one another (as one thing from another) because God is most simple and perfect.”[5]
Petrus van Mastricht denies any objective difference between the attributes: “[The attributes] do not differ really, as one thing from another, but by our reason or thought.”[6]
Joel Beeke and Paul Smalley write, “God’s simplicity means that he has no parts, and his attributes and essence are all one in him.”[7]
On face value, it seems like White has spotted a serious issue with divine simplicity. Indeed, he is not the first to make this observation. Charles Hodge made the same point.
In a statement similar to White’s, Hodge writes, “If in God eternity is identical with knowledge, knowledge with power, power with ubiquity, and ubiquity with holiness, we are using words without meaning when we attribute any perfection to God.”[8] Again he writes, “We must not confound the attributes, making them all mean the same thing, which is the equivalent to denying them all together.”[9]
Hodge apparently had the same concern as White. And, based on the quotes listed above, it may seem like their concern is well grounded.
But is it really possible that Dolezal, Owen, Turretin, Mastricht, Beeke, Smalley, and countless others never considered this objection? Is it really true that they all forbid any distinction between the attributes? Do they teach, as White says, “You cannot discuss the attributes of God in a way that would make them different to one another?”
They certainly do not.
A Better Explanation
Dr. White’s mischaracterization of simplicity is actually very common. For this reason, many defenders of simplicity have anticipated and answered it directly.
Richard Muller writes, “The various modern readings of simplicity as indicating an utter absence of distinction in the Godhead misinterpret the traditional doctrine.”[10] In an article on Aquinas’ doctrine of simplicity, Tyler Wittman notes, “With its purely negative function, simplicity rules out composition and divisibility in God but not distinction.”[11] Explaining Turretin’s ideas of “comparative” and “absolute” simplicity, Steven Duby writes, “Absolute simplicity excludes composition of all kinds, though, crucially, not distinctions of all kinds.”[12]
So, these advocates of simplicity believe that the doctrine has never ruled out all distinction, as White claims. For lack of space (and skill on my part), we can’t go through all the work of Dolezal, Owen, Turretin, Mastricht, Beeke, and Smalley on this subject. But a quick look at Francis Turretin will show a better explanation of simplicity than that offered by White.
In-n-Out Attributes
As noted above, Turretin does believe God’s attributes are identical in some sense. He says, “Attributes may be mutually predicated of each other in an identical sense inasmuch as they may be considered as having unity and identity with each other.”[13]
However, he is still able to distinguish between them because he differentiates between God’s attributes ad intra and ad extra. Theologians speak of God ad intra when they refer to things strictly within God’s being. They speak of God ad extra when they refer to God’s action in creation.
So, Turretin is able to say the attributes are indivisibly identical ad intra yet distinguishable ad extra. He writes, “The properties are many on the part of the object and end (or of the operations and effects), but not on the part of the subject or principle, which is one and perfectly simple.”[14]
In regards to the subject (ad intra), the attributes are identical. In regards to the object (ad extra), they are distinct. For Turretin, even justice and mercy are not separate ad intra. Again he writes,
“The divine attributes may be regarded either absolutely and subjectively in themselves (and on the part of God) or relatively as to their effects towards creatures (or on the part of the object). I confess that in the latter way punitive justice and sparing mercy are opposed, but not in the former (concerning which we treat).”[15]
à Brakel makes a similar point:
“We understand these attributes to be one from God’s perspective, however, such that they can neither be divorced from the divine Being nor essentially and properly from each other as they exist in God [ad intra], but are the simple, absolute Being of God Himself. We, however, relate these attributes as distinct entities by themselves. Justice and mercy are one in God [ad intra], but we differentiate between them in reference to the objects towards which they are manifested, and the effects of these manifestations [ad extra].”[16]
You can see how careful à Brakel is to distinguish between “in God” and not “in God.” He and Turretin carefully teach that the multiple attributes have their foundation in the divine essence but do not reflect actual distinctions within the essence. Duby writes, “Turretin clarifies that the foundation of the distinction between…one attribute and another is not intrinsic to the acting of the subject (God), for that would compromise his simplicity.” Instead of finding their distinctions between one another in their subject, the attributes find their distinctions in their objects and effects. Duby continues,
“While there is no distinction between ‘thing’ and ‘thing’ in God himself, the distinction of the attributes does have a ‘foundation in the thing’ (fundamentum in re) or an extramental distinction because of the diversity of objects and effects to which our conceptions of the attributes respond.”[17]
The attributes are not different things. But the one thing, which is God’s essence, is known by its effects in creation. Furthermore, those effects do legitimately teach something about the one thing, even if what they teach is incomplete.
Beeke and Smalley conclude, “If asked how the attributes are distinct when God is simply one, we reply with Turretin that they are distinct intellectual concepts by which God reveals himself to man on a human level and they are properly said to be distinct because they represent God’s activity ‘as to their various objects and effects.’”[18]
Conclusion
Do Classical Theists say the attributes are indistinguishable? Yes, ad intra.
Do they say the attributes cannot be distinguished at all? No, they say the attributes can be distinguished ad extra.
Muller summarizes Alain of Lille saying,
“Everything in God is God, allowing no essential distinction between the various divine attributes and affirming the utter simplicity of the divine being. The distinction between the attributes, therefore, is not in God himself but in the effects of God’s work ad extra. Nonetheless, given that these attributes are evident to us by way of causality, they are not merely names of terms applied by us to God but are in fact proper designations of the divine substance.”[19]
Beeke and Smalley suggest a prism to illustrate this position. They write, “For us to understand and appreciate God’s attributes, we must view the full spectrum of colors through the prism of God’s Word, but in God, the attributes shine a single, infinitely brilliant light.”[20] In this illustration, the spectrum of colors coming out of the prism are like God’s attributes ad extra because they reveal something about the singular light going into the prism, which is like God’s simple essence ad intra.
We comprehend God’s attributes as distinct not because there is actual complexity within God, but because we cannot comprehend the fullness of God’s being. We must comprehend Him in parts because we can’t comprehend Him any other way. As Turretin says, we comprehend Him “imperfectly and inadequately on account of the weakness of the human intellect and the eminence and perfection of the divine nature.”[21] And again, “For what we cannot take in by one adequate conception as being finite, we divide into various inadequate conceptions so as to obtain some knowledge of him.”[22]
The Puritan William Ames agrees, “Because we are not able to take in this essence in one act of comprehension, it is explained as manifold, that is to say, as if consisting of many attributes.”[23] Cornelius Van Til also states, “God himself has in his revelation instructed us to make distinctions with respect to his being. These distinctions help us to understand something of the wealth and richness of his being.”[24]
Turretin, Ames, and Van Til all affirm here that we distinguish between God’s attributes because of 1) our finitude and 2) the “the richness of his being.” Therefore, the distinctions made between the attributes are not based on any real distinction in God’s essence, as Hodge (and White) believes. Instead, we distinguish between them in order to comprehend different aspects of God’s indivisible being.
I want to give Dr. White the benefit of the doubt and assume that he has studied and spoken on this topic elsewhere, but he unfortunately does not present the position accurately in this video. The “Classical Theism stuff” being presented today does not deny all distinction between the attributes. It denies distinction ad intra but demands it ad extra.
Although this whole debate may seem like doctrinal minutia, what is more fundamental to our faith than the very being of God? All believers should strive to worship and love God as He is. As Van Til rightly understood, we don’t study theology with merely pragmatic motivations. Instead, “The question of truth and of duty is primary.”[25] This is why we care about the details. We have a duty to love and worship God as He has revealed Himself to us.
Further Reading:
Beeke and Smalley give a helpful introduction to simplicity and actually respond to White’s specific objection: Reformed Systematic Theology, Volume 1 by Joel R. Beeke and Paul M. Smalley.
To frame the current debate: All That Is in God by James Dolezal.
Read the relevant sections of Charles Hodge’s and Turretin’s theologies to compare and contrast their views.
If you can get it, Steven Duby wrote a helpful guide to Turretin’s understanding of simplicity: Steven J. Duby, “Receiving No Perfection from Another: Francis Turretin on Divine Simplicity.” Modern Theology 35:3 (July 2019).
References:
[1] He raises that concern clearly in this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXOxFdDcQVw
[2] https:>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKCLbxqWnEo&t=1s. I’m not sure which video White is referencing, but here’s a similar quote from Dr. Craig: “Even though God would be a purely spiritual substance and not composed of spiritual parts, nevertheless he could have the property of omniscience and the property of omnipotence and the property of holiness or goodness—and these aren’t the same property. To be omniscience is obviously not be good. To be omnipotent is not the same as to be eternal. So, there can be a plurality or multiplicity of properties that God would have. And therefore, there would be composition in that sense. I find that sense unobjectionable. But the Thomist can’t even allow that.” https:>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIUv-pq0KmA
[3] James Dolezal, All That Is In God (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2017), 42.
[4] John Owen, The Works of John Owen, vol. 12 (Ediburgh: Banner of Truth, 1966), 72.
[5] Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992), 1:188.
[6] Petrus van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, Vol. 2, Faith in the Triune God, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2019), 117.
[7] Joel R. Beeke and Paul M. Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, Revelation and God (Wheaton: Crossway, 2019), 625.
[8] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:372.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3, The Divine Essence and Attributes (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 45.
[11] Wittman, Tyler R. “'Not a God of Confusion but of Peace': Aquinas and the Meaning of Divine Simplicity.” Modern Theology 32, no. 2 (April 2016), 160.
[12] Steven J. Duby, “Receiving No Perfection from Another: Francis Turretin on Divine Simplicity,” Modern Theology 35:3 (July 2019), 526.
[13] Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:189.
[14] Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:189.
[15] Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:189. Brakel makes the same argument from the same attributes.
[16] Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, Vol. 1, trans, Bartel Elshout, ed. Joel R. Beeke (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2007), 89. Underline added.
[17] Duby, “Receiving No Perfection from Another: Francis Turretin on Divine Simplicity,” 528.
[18] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, God and Revelation, 632.
[19] Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3, The Divine Essence and Attributes, 44.
[20] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, God and Revelation, 632.
[21] Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:189.
[22] Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:187–188. He adds: “The divine attributes are the essential properties by which he makes himself known to us who are weak and those by which he is distinguished from creatures; or they are those which are attributed to him according to the measure of our conception in order to explain his nature.” And again, “He who conceives what is actually and really one and simple in God as actually and really diverse, conceives what is false. But he who conceives that which is actually one in itself as more than one virtually and extrinsically or objectively, does not conceive of what is false. Rather, he conceives the thing imperfectly and inadequately on account of the weakness of the human intellect and the eminence and perfection of the divine nature.” Ibid., 1:187 and 1:189. Emphasis added.
[23] William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John Dykstra Eusden (1629; repr. Grand Rapids: 1968), 84.
[24] Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 2nd ed., ed. William Edgar (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1974), 323.
[25] Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 21.